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Microsimulation applied to Pension System: Redistribution effect od Reforms in Italy

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  • Francesco MARCHIONNE

    (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Economia)

Abstract

Amato reform ('92), Dini reform ('95), Prodi reform ('98), Maroni-Berlusconi reform ('04): in the last 15 years all governments have modified the Italian pension system. What has changed? What will change? Why? What are the goals? In the chaos of reforms the only certainty for the citizens seems that future pensions will be lower than present ones. But ... how lower will they be? Who has really "won" the reform match? In the general reduction in performance, who has "lost less"? And above all, is the era of reforms in Italy over or is it just the first half of a "film"? In the following pages, I will try to answer to all these questions. In the first part, I will analyze the characteristics of the Italian pension system before the 90's reforms to understand how they have affected the pension system system. In the second part, I will try to foresee the effects these reforms will have in the next decade through a microsimulation model. This model has been created with an innovative procedure based on an integrated (and non sequential) simulation of events. This new approach should guarantee more efficiency with respect to the traditional one even though there are some technical complications in its implementation. Two main results have been obtained. The first one is that actuarial equity is mainly achieved by homogenising regimes and by raising the minimum requisites for being eligible for pension ('92 reform) more than through the introduction of defined contributions ('95 reform). The second result is that excessive lowering of benefits affects negatively on actuarial equity weakening a basic principle established by the reforms themselves. Practically, the non-division of assistance from pension system and the low level of performance determine unhomogeneous benefits. From a pure actuarial defined contribution system point of view, it is unjustified. Without praising how much good has been achieved till date, the new reforms should be aimed at overcoming these precise obstacles.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco MARCHIONNE, 2007. "Microsimulation applied to Pension System: Redistribution effect od Reforms in Italy," Working Papers 291, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:291
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guido Tabellini, 2000. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 523-545, September.
    2. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X, 1996. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 277-304, June.
    3. Martin Feldstein, 1998. "Privatizing Social Security," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld98-1, March.
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