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Managerial Compensation In Midwestern Cooperatives: Results From A Follow-Up Study

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  • King, Robert P.
  • Trechter, David D.
  • Cobia, David W.

Abstract

In the 1995 issue of the Journal of Cooperatives, Trechter and King reported findings from a survey of managerial compensation practices in Minnesota and Wisconsin cooperatives that was conducted in 1993. The results from that study indicated that overall compensation and bonuses received by general managers of local cooperatives were more closely associated with cooperative size measures than with levels of profitability. The results also suggested that there was not a strong relationship between compensation practices and cooperative performance, measured by return on assets. A follow-up compensation survey was conducted in 1994. The study population was expanded to include local cooperatives in North Dakota, along with the Minnesota and Wisconsin cooperatives that responded to the first survey questionnaire. In addition, new questions were added to the survey to elicit information on the use of specific cooperative performance targets in settings where there were no explicit incentive clauses in the manager's contract. Finally, collecting compensation data for a second consecutive year made it possible to analyze factors associated with changes in compensation levels. Results from this follow-up survey are reported here. In the sections that follow, data collection procedures are first briefly summarized. Then findings regarding compensation levels and changes in compensation performance are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • King, Robert P. & Trechter, David D. & Cobia, David W., 1997. "Managerial Compensation In Midwestern Cooperatives: Results From A Follow-Up Study," Staff Papers 13992, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umaesp:13992
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.13992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Trechter, David D. & King, Robert P., 1995. "Executive Compensation Patterns and Practices in Minnesota and Wisconsin Cooperatives," Journal of Cooperatives, NCERA-210, vol. 10, pages 1-15.
    2. Antle, R & Smith, A, 1986. "An Empirical-Investigation Of The Relative Performance Evaluation Of Corporate-Executives," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(1), pages 1-39.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ortmann, Gerald F. & King, Robert P., 2006. "Small-Scale Farmers in South Africa: Can Agricultural Cooperatives Facilitate Access to Input and Product Markets?," Staff Papers 13930, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    2. Iliopoulos, C. & Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2008. "Influence Costs in Agribusiness Cooperatives: Evidence from Case Studies," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2008-040-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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