Sweet Persuasion: Soft Drinks, School Funding, And Children'S Health
"Pouring rights" contracts between soft drink companies and schools have created substantial controversy. Treating the issue as externality problem, we analyze the Pigouvian tax solution and propose a contract between the government and schools to provide an incentive compatible method for government to utilize the tax revenue.
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- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002.
"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Lange, Andreas & Requate, Till, 2000. " Pigouvian Taxes in General Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax Redistribution Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 25-42. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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