The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
In: Financial Markets and Financial Crises
The 1980s S&L debacle is generally viewed as the result of: (1) sharply rising interest rates eliminating the net worth of thrifts funding fixed-rate loans with short-term deposits and (2) thrifts responding by taking even greater interest-rate and credit risks. The question investigated in this paper is how vulnerable do thrifts remain to an interest rate experience like that which triggered the 1980s S&L debacle? The short answer is that thrifts are even more vulnerable in 1989 than they were in 1977. The dollar volume of fixed-rate mortgages funded by short-term deposits in 1989, $400 billion, is slightly greater now than it was in 1977, and thrifts have also put over $325 billion of adjustable-rate loans with rate caps on their balance sheets. A sharp rise in interest rates (the one-year Treasury rate rose by 9 percentage points between 1977 and 1981) would cause significant losses on these capped loans, as well as on the fixed-rate loans.
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|This chapter was published in: ||This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number
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- Stephen A. Buser & Patric H. Hendershott & Anthony B. Sanders, 1985. "Pricing Life-of-Loan Rate Caps on Default-Free Adjustable-Rate Mortgages," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 13(3), pages 248-260.
- George G. Kaufman, 1984. "Measuring and managing interest rate risk: A primer," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Jan, pages 16-29.
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