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The Shock of the Old: The First Financial Crisis of the Twenty-first Century

In: Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation

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  • Geoffrey Wood

Abstract

Bringing scholars and policymakers to the frontiers of research and addressing the critical issues of the day, the book presents original important new theoretical and empirical results. The distinguished contributors include: P. Agrel, K. Alexander, J. Crémer, X. Dassiou, G. Deltas, F. Etro, L. Filistrucchi, P. Fotis, M. Gilli, J. Harrington Jr, T. Huertas, M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, V. Marques, M. Peitz, Y. Spiegel, E. Tarrantino and G. Wood.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffrey Wood, 2012. "The Shock of the Old: The First Financial Crisis of the Twenty-first Century," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14933_17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), 2012. "Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14933.
    2. Kroszner, Randall S & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before 1933," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 810-832, September.
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