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Sangram Vilasrao Kadam

Personal Details

First Name:Sangram
Middle Name:Vilasrao
Last Name:Kadam
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pka1144
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
RePEc:edi:deharus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers

Working papers

  1. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Multi-period Matching," Working Paper Series rwp15-030, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    • Sangram V. Kadam & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2018. "Multiperiod Matching," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1927-1947, November.
  2. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  3. Kadam, Sangram V, 2014. "Unilateral Substitutability implies Substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Working Paper 139666, Harvard University OpenScholar.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Multi-period Matching," Working Paper Series rwp15-030, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    • Sangram V. Kadam & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2018. "Multiperiod Matching," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1927-1947, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-042, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    4. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    5. Morimitsu Kurino, 2020. "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 135-165, January.
    6. Davi B. Costa, 2021. "Benefits of marriage as a search strategy," Papers 2108.04885, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    7. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    8. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    9. Matsui, Akihiko & Murakami, Megumi, 2022. "Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 50-65.
    10. Daisuke Hirata & Yusuke Kasuya & Kentaro Tomoeda, 2019. "Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem," Working Paper Series 2019/07, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    11. Marek Pycia & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2021. "Matching with externalities," ECON - Working Papers 392, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    12. Liu, Ce, 2018. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Working Papers 2018-13, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Shi, Fanqi, 2021. "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 492-502.
    14. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    15. Liu, Ce & Ali, S. Nageeb, 2019. "Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2019-8, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    16. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Scott Duke Kominers & Ran I. Shorrer, 2019. "To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories," Papers 1906.10333, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    17. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Alessandro MARTINELLO, 2018. "Dynamic Refugee Matching," Cahiers de recherche 22-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    18. Ramesh Johari & Vijay Kamble & Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Matching While Learning," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 655-681, March.

  2. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

    Cited by:

    1. Morimitsu Kurino, 2020. "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 135-165, January.
    2. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    3. Liu, Ce, 2023. "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.

  3. Kadam, Sangram V, 2014. "Unilateral Substitutability implies Substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Working Paper 139666, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao, 2017. "Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 56-68.
    2. Ravi Jagadeesan, 2019. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 191-224, August.
    3. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2014. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    4. Zhang, Jun, 2016. "On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 230-234.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2015-09-05 2015-09-05
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2015-09-05

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