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Australia’s Anti-dumping and Countervailing System


  • Commission, Productivity

    () (Productivity Commission)


This inquiry report was released on 27 May 2010. The Australian anti-dumping system, which is based on agreed WTO rules and procedures, benefits a small number of import competing firms, but imposes greater costs on the rest of the economy. However, this net economic cost is likely to be very small. And the ability for Australian industries, like those in most other countries, to use the system to address what are perceived by many to be ‘unfair’ trading practices, may have lessened resistance to more significant tariff reforms. This ‘political economy’ argument for retaining the system would be strengthened by changes to address a number of deficiencies in the current arrangements which can add to the costs for the community. In particular: there is no consideration of the wider economic impacts of anti-dumping measures; measures can too easily become akin to long-term protection, or outdated in the face of changing market circumstances; decision-making and its outcomes are not sufficiently transparent. Introduction of a ‘bounded’ public interest test, drawing on similar provisions overseas, would be a practical means to take account of wider impacts and prevent the imposition of measures that would be disproportionately costly.

Suggested Citation

  • Commission, Productivity, 2010. "Australia’s Anti-dumping and Countervailing System," Inquiry Reports, Productivity Commission, Government of Australia, number 48.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:prodir:0048

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    tariffs; import controls; anti-dumping; trading practices;

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • N70 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
    • P45 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages


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