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Institutionelle Regeln und deren Einfluss auf Risikoprämien an Anleihemärkten

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  • Moessinger, Marc-Daniel

Abstract

Die im Zusammenhang mit der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise in vielen Ländern angestiegenen Risikoprämien für Staatsanleihen belasten die nationalen Haushalte. Ungeachtet notwendiger Konsolidierungserfordernisse stellt sich die Frage, welche institutionellen Maßnahmen geeignet sind, dieser Problematik zu begegnen.

Suggested Citation

  • Moessinger, Marc-Daniel, 2013. "Institutionelle Regeln und deren Einfluss auf Risikoprämien an Anleihemärkten," ZEW Wachstums- und Konjunkturanalysen, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, vol. 16(2), pages 6-7.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewwka:126067
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo.
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