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On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences

Author

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  • Marcin Anholcer
  • Maciej Bartkowiak

Abstract

Motivated by recent results on lexicographic and cyclic preferences, we present new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matching in many-sided matching problems. Here, our focus shifted towards integrating the two-sided matching problem, characterized by reciprocal preferences, with the many-sided matching problem, which involves cyclic preferences. In particular, we show that one of the configurations presented recently by Zhang and Zhong for three-sided matching problems can be generalized to more dimensions. In our setting, the preferences are cyclic and, in the case of all but two pairs of consecutive sets of agents, also reciprocal, which generalizes the three-set setting of Zhang and Zhong. Our approach can be also applied to generalize the problems with any system of cyclic preferences for which the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Anholcer & Maciej Bartkowiak, 2024. "On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 34(3), pages 1-13.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:34:y:2024:i:3:p:1-13:id:1
    DOI: 10.37190/ord240301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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