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Essential Stability of Pareto Equilibrium for Two‐Person Differential Games

Author

Listed:
  • Wei-Ji
  • Guanzheng-Hu
  • Ji-Lin
  • Zhongbo-Dai
  • Wanqing-Xu

Abstract

This paper investigates two‐player differential games governed by ordinary differential equations, whose Pareto equilibria constitute a dense residual subset of the game and for which every point of the Pareto equilibrium is essential. Furthermore, we prove that the Pareto equilibrium of such games possesses an essential connected component.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei-Ji & Guanzheng-Hu & Ji-Lin & Zhongbo-Dai & Wanqing-Xu, 2025. "Essential Stability of Pareto Equilibrium for Two‐Person Differential Games," Journal of Mathematics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2025(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jjmath:v:2025:y:2025:i:1:n:7047815
    DOI: 10.1155/jom/7047815
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yu, Jian, 1999. "Essential equilibria of n-person noncooperative games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 361-372, April.
    2. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2015. "Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 277-300, June.
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