IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/empleg/v23y2026i1p102-127.html

Judicial Perceptions of Legal Difficulty: An Empirical Inquiry

Author

Listed:
  • Brian Sheppard
  • Michael Coenen
  • Andrew Moshirnia

Abstract

The law often asks judges to determine whether a violation is clearly established or whether legal language clearly or unambiguously supports a position. It demands that litigants not raise arguments or claims that would be easily dismissed. And for their part legal scholars have relied on the distinction between easy and hard cases as they delineate the concept of law itself. Yet, few have empirically studied assessments of legal difficulty. Here, we present the results of two studies that provide insight into the reliability of such assessments from laypeople and actual judges. For both populations, our key finding was this: assessments of case difficulty are highly predictive of the vote breakdown in a case; that is, the larger the size of a majority coalition, the lower the average difficulty rating registered by the members of that coalition (and, conversely, the smaller the size of a minority coalition, the higher the rating registered by its members). These results suggest that, while assessments of case difficulty are tied to case outcomes, they are a complex signal. Experiencing the feeling that a case is unusually difficult is not necessarily an indication that you are dealing with a 50/50 case, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it may be an indication that your position on the merits would be decisively rejected by the vast majority of others confronting the same question.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Sheppard & Michael Coenen & Andrew Moshirnia, 2026. "Judicial Perceptions of Legal Difficulty: An Empirical Inquiry," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(1), pages 102-127, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:23:y:2026:i:1:p:102-127
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.70017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.70017
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jels.70017?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 1984. "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-56, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pyle, William, 2006. "Resolutions, recoveries and relationships: The evolution of payment disputes in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 317-337, June.
    2. Mocetti, Sauro & Pesenti, Ottavia & Roma, Giacomo, 2026. "The effects of the reform of the judicial map on the functioning of civil justice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 248(C).
    3. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2007. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 627-656, December.
    4. Galasso, Alberto & Schankerman, Mark, 2013. "Patents and Cumulative Innovation:Causal Evidence from the Courts," IIR Working Paper 13-16, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Benito Arruñada, 2023. "La protección administrativa de las relaciones financieras," Fedea Economy Notes 2023-11, FEDEA.
    6. Fotis, Panagiotis & Tselekounis, Markos, 2020. "Optimal Reduction of Cartel Fines induced by the Settlement Procedure," MPRA Paper 99154, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Zhang, Pengfei & Li, Ji, 2025. "Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    8. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2024. "State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(3), pages 793-806, November.
    9. Malcolm Coate & Shawn Ulrick, 2009. "Do Court Decisions Drive the Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement Policy on Merger Settlements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(2), pages 99-114, March.
    10. Eric, Van den Steen, 2002. "Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents," Working papers 4255-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    11. Linda R. Cohen & Jun Ishii, 2005. "Competition, Innovation and Racing for Priority at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office," Working Papers 050604, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    12. L. A. Franzoni, 2016. "Optimal liability design under risk and ambiguity," Working Papers wp1048, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    13. Chen, Daniel L. & Levonyan, Vardges & Yeh, Susan, 2016. "Policies Affect Preferences: Evidence from Random Variation in Abortion Jurisprudence," IAST Working Papers 16-58, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    14. Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, 2010. "The Trouble with Cases," NBER Chapters, in: Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, pages 45-70, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jessica Bregant & Verity Winship, 2023. "Settlement schemas: How laypeople understand civil settlement," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(3), pages 488-533, September.
    16. Jef De Mot & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Comparing All-Or-Nothing and Proportionate Damages: A Rent Seeking Approach," Working papers 2014-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    17. Evan Osborne, 2010. "Why Do Some Kinds of Stars Get the Calls?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(2), pages 203-213, April.
    18. Richard T. Boylan, 2012. "The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 565-591.
    19. Lars Hornuf & Lars Klöhn, 2018. "Do Judges Hate Speculators?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7375, CESifo.
    20. Hyde, Charles E. & Williams, Philip L., 2002. "Necessary costs and expenditure incentives under the English rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 133-152, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:23:y:2026:i:1:p:102-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1740-1461 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.