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Controls and Cooperation in Interactive and Non‐Interactive Settings$

Author

Listed:
  • Jace B. Garrett
  • Jeffrey A. Livingston
  • William B. Tayler
  • Nicole L. Cade
  • Sarah E. McVay

Abstract

Prior research finds that controls that induce cooperation among collaborators on a project increase trust, and that this increased trust increases subsequent cooperation among collaborators. We extend this work by investigating how controls influence cooperative behavior in two settings. The first is an interactive setting where people work together and can benefit from each other's work. The second is a non‐interactive setting where people do not work together directly but where behavior can be observed. We propose that because controls are likely to engender greater trust and reciprocity in interactive settings than in non‐interactive settings, the effect of controls on future cooperative behavior will be greater for controls in interactive settings than for controls in non‐interactive settings. We find that controls in both settings increase future cooperative behavior, but the effect is significantly greater in interactive settings (where reciprocity and trust are more likely to develop). Furthermore, this increased cooperation is observed in an uncontrolled task, suggesting that the control fosters trust in others rather than trust in the control. These findings suggest that the benefits of controls are more substantial in work environments characterized by extensive teamwork and where employees benefit from each other's work. Contrôles et coopération en contexte interactif et non interactif Les études antérieures ont démontré que les contrôles qui induisent la coopération chez les collaborateurs travaillant à un projet augmentent la confiance, et que cette confiance accrue intensifie par la suite la coopération entre les collaborateurs. Les auteurs poussent plus loin l’étude de la question en s'interrogeant sur la façon dont les contrôles influent sur le comportement de coopération dans deux contextes. Ils se penchent en premier lieu sur le contexte interactif, dans lequel les gens travaillent ensemble et peuvent bénéficier du travail de chacun, et en second lieu sur le contexte non interactif dans lequel les gens ne travaillent pas directement ensemble, quoique leur comportement puisse être observé. Selon l'hypothèse des auteurs, du fait que les contrôles sont susceptibles d'engendrer une confiance et une réciprocité plus grandes en contexte interactif qu'en contexte non interactif, l'incidence des contrôles sur le comportement futur de coopération devrait être plus marquée lorsque ces contrôles sont appliqués en contexte interactif que lorsqu'ils le sont en contexte non interactif. Les auteurs constatent que les contrôles intensifient le comportement futur de coopération dans les deux cas, mais que cette intensification est sensiblement plus importante dans le contexte interactif (où la réciprocité et la confiance sont davantage susceptibles de se développer). En outre, cette coopération accrue est observée dans le cadre d'une tâche non contrôlée, ce qui semble indiquer que le contrôle favorise la confiance dans les autres plutôt que la confiance dans le contrôle. Ces observations permettent de croire que les avantages des contrôles sont plus notables dans les environnements caractérisés par un travail d’équipe extensif, où les employés bénéficient du travail de chacun.

Suggested Citation

  • Jace B. Garrett & Jeffrey A. Livingston & William B. Tayler & Nicole L. Cade & Sarah E. McVay, 2019. "Controls and Cooperation in Interactive and Non‐Interactive Settings$," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 2494-2520, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:36:y:2019:i:4:p:2494-2520
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12489
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    3. Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Graetz, Michael J. & Wilde, Louis L., 1990. "The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 1977-1986," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 43(4), pages 395-409, December.
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    1. Yunshil Cha & Bernard Wong-On-Wing, 2025. "The effect of control justification on employees’ in-role and extra-role behaviors," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 133-161, March.

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