IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/coacre/v19y2002i3p365-384.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Board Characteristics and Audit Fees

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph V. Carcello
  • Dana R. Hermanson
  • Terry L. Neal
  • Richard A. Riley

Abstract

This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee “quality†are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph V. Carcello & Dana R. Hermanson & Terry L. Neal & Richard A. Riley, 2002. "Board Characteristics and Audit Fees," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 365-384, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:365-384
    DOI: 10.1506/CHWK-GMQ0-MLKE-K03V
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1506/CHWK-GMQ0-MLKE-K03V
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1506/CHWK-GMQ0-MLKE-K03V?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simunic, Da, 1980. "The Pricing Of Audit Services - Theory And Evidence," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(1), pages 161-190.
    2. Deis, Donald Jr. & Giroux, Gary, 1996. "The effect of auditor changes on audit fees, audit hours, and audit quality," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 55-76.
    3. Beatty, Rp, 1993. "The Economic-Determinants Of Auditor Compensation In The Initial Public Offerings Market," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(2), pages 294-302.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. T. S. Breusch & A. R. Pagan, 1980. "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(1), pages 239-253.
    6. Bruce K. Behn & Joseph V. Carcello & Dana R. Hermanson & Roger H. Hermanson, 1999. "Client Satisfaction and Big 6 Audit Fees," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 587-608, December.
    7. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
    8. Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
    9. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    10. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    11. Watts, Ross L & Zimmerman, Jerold L, 1983. "Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 613-633, October.
    12. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. DeFond, Mark & Zhang, Jieying, 2014. "A review of archival auditing research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 275-326.
    2. Susana Callao & José Ignacio Jarne, 2010. "Have IFRS Affected Earnings Management in the European Union?," Accounting in Europe, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 159-189, December.
    3. Jiang, Ling & Ferris, Kenneth R. & Coffman, Edward N., 2009. "The association between financially expert independent directors and the accounting for employee stock options," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-10.
    4. Rihab Grassa & Nejia Moumen & Khaled Hussainey, 2021. "What drives risk disclosure in Islamic and conventional banks? An international comparison," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 6338-6361, October.
    5. Frode Kjærland & Ane Tolnes Haugdal & Anna Søndergaard & Anne Vågslid, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in a Nordic Perspective: Evidence from the Oslo Stock Exchange," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-18, October.
    6. Shan, Yuan George & Troshani, Indrit & Richardson, Grant, 2015. "An empirical comparison of the effect of XBRL on audit fees in the US and Japan," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 89-103.
    7. Ahsan Habib & Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan, 2016. "Problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(2), pages 121-144, February.
    8. Charles Piot, 2000. "Relations D'Agence, Opportunites De Croissance Et Notoriete De L'Auditeur Externe : Une Etude Empirique Du Marche Français," Post-Print halshs-00587501, HAL.
    9. Luminita Enache & Antonio Parbonetti & Anup Srivastava, 2020. "Are all outside directors created equal with respect to firm disclosure policy?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 541-577, August.
    10. Cheng, Lee-Young & Su, Yi-Chen & Yan, Zhipeng & Zhao, Yan, 2019. "Corporate governance and target price accuracy," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 93-101.
    11. Sheng-Syan Chen & Robin K. Chou & Yun-Chi Lee, 2020. "The effects of executive compensation and outside monitoring on firms’ pre-repurchase disclosure behavior and post-repurchase performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 111-158, January.
    12. Hessian, Mohamed & Zalata, Alaa Mansour & Hussainey, Khaled, 2025. "Does the board of directors and their stock ownership mitigate interest payment classification shifting? UK evidence," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    13. Chia-Ying Chan & Iftekhar Hasan & Chih-Yung Lin, 2021. "Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1221-1258, May.
    14. Arrunada, Benito & Paz-Ares, Candido, 1997. "Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 31-61, March.
    15. Jeanjean, Thomas & Stolowy, Hervé, 2009. "Determinants of board members' financial expertise -- Empirical evidence from France," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 378-402, December.
    16. Boubaker, Sabri & Chebbi, Kaouther & Grira, Jocelyn, 2020. "Top management inside debt and corporate social responsibility? Evidence from the US," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 98-115.
    17. Knechel, W. Robert & Thomas, Edward & Driskill, Matthew, 2020. "Understanding financial auditing from a service perspective," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    18. Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan & Qiang Wu, 2012. "Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 39-52, April.
    19. Peter M Clarkson & Shams Pathan & Andrew Tellam, 2016. "Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(2), pages 244-270, May.
    20. Booth, James R. & Cornett, Marcia Millon & Tehranian, Hassan, 2002. "Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(10), pages 1973-1996, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:365-384. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1911-3846 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.