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Institutions and the quality of governance: an empirical study on interstate differences in economic development in India

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  • Bharatee Bhusana Dash

    (Department of Economics, University of Hyderabad, India)

  • Sami Angara V. Raja

    (Department of Economics, University of Hyderabad, India)

Abstract

Economic performance is closely linked to the existence of good institutions. However, the quality of governance has also been identified as an important factor that affects economic growth and development. This paper empirically examines the significance of these factors in explaining variations in the per capita GDP of the Indian states and the extent of industrialization across them. Towards this end, indices for institutions—such as the protection of property rights, the efficiency of the legal system at the state level and the rule of law—as well as indicators of the extent and quality of State intervention and political stability, have been constructed to bring them into an empirically testable format. Empirical findings suggest that the quality of governance is significant in explaining the variations in state per capita GDP. Institutional factors play a significant role in explaining variations in the extent of industrialization across the Indian states.

Suggested Citation

  • Bharatee Bhusana Dash & Sami Angara V. Raja, 2009. "Institutions and the quality of governance: an empirical study on interstate differences in economic development in India," Asia-Pacific Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 16(1), pages 1-26, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:unt:jnapdj:v:16:y:2009:i:1:p:1-26
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamasb, Tooraj & Llorca, Manuel & Khetrapal, Pavan & Thakur, Tripta, 2021. "Institutions and performance of regulated firms: Evidence from electricity distribution in India," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 68-82.
    2. Amrita Dillon & SUMON MAJUMDAR & SHARUN W. MUKAND, 2015. "Institution Building and Political Accountability," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 504-527, August.
    3. Tooraj Jamasb & Manuel Llorca & Pavan Khetrapal & Tripta Thakur, 2018. "Institutions and Performance of Regulated Firms: Evidence from Electric Utilities in the Indian States," Working Papers EPRG 1809, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    4. Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2014. "Regional Income Disparity and Government Intervention in India," South Asia Economic Journal, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, vol. 15(2), pages 281-314, September.
    5. Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun W, 2013. "Institution Building and Political Economy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 131, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Garg, Sandya & Ashima Goyal & Rupayan Pal, 2014. "Why tax effort falls short of capacity in Indian states: A Stochastic frontier approach," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-032, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutions; growth; development; Indian states;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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