Short-Time Compensation: Job Security, and Employment Contracts: Evidence from Selected OECD Countries
In this paper, a model of optimal employment contracting describes differences across countries in firing restrictions and short-time compensation systems for workers forced to work shorter hours to avoid layoff. The model predicts that the existence of a short-time compensation system will generate major fluctuations in working hours only if the short-time compensation system is more generous than the traditional unemployment insurance system. A test performed for ten OECD countries shows that in countries with generous short-time compensation systems, the speed of adjustment of total hours worked is higher than in the United States, despite a much slower adjustment in the number of workers employed. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.
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- Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
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"Job security and work force adjustment: How different are U.S. and Japanese practices?,"
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 500-521, December.
- Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1993. "Job Security and Work Force Adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Christopher F. Buechtemann (ed.), Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior: Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence, pages 180-199 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1992. "Job Security and Work Force Adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Giorgio Galeazzi & Daniel Hamermesh (ed.), Dynamic Labor Demand and Adjustment Costs, pages 280-301 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, "undated". "Job Security and Work Force adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles kgasnh1989, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1989. "Job Security and Work Force Adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," NBER Working Papers 3155, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402.
- Nadiri, M Ishaq & Rosen, Sherwin, 1969. "Interrelated Factor Demand Functions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 457-471, Part I Se.
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