Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery Process
An analysis of the futures market delivery 'end game' specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for long and short traders to manipulate futures prices at contract expiration. The empirical and welfare implications of manipulation are derived as well. Manipulation is most likely to occur in markets where economic frictions (such as transportation and transactions costs) make it inefficient to return excessive deliveries to their original owners. These consumption distortions induce price changes that favor manipulators. Manipulation may also occur in markets where such costs are unimportant but the necessary conditions for the manipulation of a frictionless market are very restrictive. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:66:y:1993:i:3:p:335-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.