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Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery Process


  • Pirrong, Stephen Craig


An analysis of the futures market delivery 'end game' specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for long and short traders to manipulate futures prices at contract expiration. The empirical and welfare implications of manipulation are derived as well. Manipulation is most likely to occur in markets where economic frictions (such as transportation and transactions costs) make it inefficient to return excessive deliveries to their original owners. These consumption distortions induce price changes that favor manipulators. Manipulation may also occur in markets where such costs are unimportant but the necessary conditions for the manipulation of a frictionless market are very restrictive. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1993. "Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery Process," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 335-369, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:66:y:1993:i:3:p:335-69

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
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    6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    7. Mark Rubinstein., 1989. "Market Basket Alternatives," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-187, University of California at Berkeley.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stocking, Andrew, 2012. "Unintended consequences of price controls: An application to allowance markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 120-136.
    2. Lien, Donald & Tse, Yiu Kuen, 2006. "A survey on physical delivery versus cash settlement in futures contracts," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 15-29.
    3. Cumming, D. & Johan, S.A., 2008. "Global market surveillance," Discussion Paper 2008-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    4. Owen Lamont, 2004. "Go Down Fighting: Short Seller vs. Firms," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2521, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Aug 2004.
    5. E. Mamatzakis, 2014. "Revealing asymmetries in the loss function of WTI oil futures market," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 411-426, September.
    6. Cumming, Douglas & Dannhauser, Robert & Johan, Sofia, 2015. "Financial market misconduct and agency conflicts: A synthesis and future directions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 150-168.
    7. Aitken, Michael & Cumming, Douglas & Zhan, Feng, 2015. "Exchange trading rules, surveillance and suspected insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 311-330.
    8. Merrick, John Jr & Naik, Narayan Y. & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2005. "Strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market: anatomy of a squeeze," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 171-218, July.
    9. Cumming, Douglas & Johan, Sofia & Li, Dan, 2011. "Exchange trading rules and stock market liquidity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 651-671, March.
    10. Tālis J. Putniņš, 2012. "Market Manipulation: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 952-967, December.
    11. Aitken, Michael & Cumming, Douglas & Zhan, Feng, 2013. "Exchange trading rules, surveillance and insider trading," CFS Working Paper Series 2013/15, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    12. Bungo Miyazaki & Kiyoshi Izumi & Fujio Toriumi & Ryo Takahashi, 2014. "Change Detection Of Orders In Stock Markets Using A Gaussian Mixture Model," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 169-191, July.

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