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Facilitating the Teacher Quality Gap? Collective Bargaining Agreements, Teacher Hiring and Transfer Rules, and Teacher Assignment Among Schools in California

Author

Listed:
  • William S. Koski

    (Stanford Law School)

  • Eileen L. Horng

    (Institute for Research on Education Policy and Practice, Stanford University)

Abstract

Certain studies and the California legislature have recently concluded that seniority preference rules in teacher collective bargaining agreements facilitate a teacher ‘quality gap’ by permitting senior teachers to transfer to schools with higher-performing and more affluent children. This study examines the effects of such transfer rules on the distribution of teachers among and within school districts in California. The study finds that, when comparing California districts to each other, strong seniority preference rules are associated with a greater percentage of credentialed teachers in school districts. Employing hierarchical linear modeling, the study then finds that schools with higher percentages of minority students, within districts, have lower percentages of credentialed and experienced teachers. Contrary to certain previous research and conventional wisdom, however, this study finds no persuasive evidence that the seniority preference rules independently affect the distribution of teachers among schools or exacerbate the negative relationship between higher minority schools and uncredentialed and low-experience teachers. © 2007 American Education Finance Association

Suggested Citation

  • William S. Koski & Eileen L. Horng, 2007. "Facilitating the Teacher Quality Gap? Collective Bargaining Agreements, Teacher Hiring and Transfer Rules, and Teacher Assignment Among Schools in California," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 2(3), pages 262-300, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:edfpol:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:262-300
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marianno, Bradley D. & Strunk, Katharine O., 2018. "The bad end of the bargain?: Revisiting the relationship between collective bargaining agreements and student achievement," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 93-106.
    2. Jason A. Grissom & Susanna Loeb & Nathaniel Nakashima, 2013. "Strategic Involuntary Teacher Transfers and Teacher Performance: Examining Equity and Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 19108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Joshua M. Cowen & Marcus A. Winters, 2013. "Do Charters Retain Teachers Differently? Evidence from Elementary Schools in Florida," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 14-42, January.
    4. Bradley D. Marianno & Paul Bruno & Kathrine O. Strunk, 2021. "The Effect of Teachers’ Union Contracts on School District Efficiency: Longitudinal Evidence From California," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(1), pages 21582440209, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    teacher quality; collective bargaining; teacher hiring; teacher assignment; teacher transfer; California;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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