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Fiscal institutions and the funding of US state and local pension plans

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  • Qiushi Wang

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between the funded ratio of US public pension plans and several fiscal institutions adopted by state governments. The author analysed a large data set from 1997 to 2012, and found that states with stricter balanced budget requirements and debt limits had a lower pension funded ratio, whereas states with tax and spending limits in place had a higher funded ratio. The findings contribute to the current debate on public sector pension reforms in the US and internationally.

Suggested Citation

  • Qiushi Wang, 2017. "Fiscal institutions and the funding of US state and local pension plans," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(7), pages 507-514, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:pubmmg:v:37:y:2017:i:7:p:507-514
    DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2017.1372112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December.
    2. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, "undated". "Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States (Reprint 060)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 10-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Do Budget Rules Work?," NBER Working Papers 5550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    1. Trang Hoang & Craig S. Maher, 2022. "Fiscal condition, institutional constraints, and public pension contribution: are pension contribution shortfalls fiscal illusion?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 93-124, December.

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