The political economy of the food subsidy system in Bangladesh
This article examines the operation of the food subsidy system in Bangladesh from 1980 to 1995 using a political economy perspective. Two political economy concepts - rent-seeking lobbies and rent-seeking bureaucrats/agents - are found to be useful in providing a partial explanation of why this system has failed to benefit the rural poor. However, each of these explanations is incomplete because it fails to consider the large impact that external actors - USAID and the World Bank - have had on the Bangladesh food subsidy system. One way to improve the ability of this system to reach the poor would be to increase the amount of self-targeting in food subsidies by building on the Food-for- Work programme.
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Volume (Year): 35 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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