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The New Division of Labor in the Globalized Economy: Women’s Challenges and Opportunities

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  • Valeria Sodano

Abstract

The way in which the new international division of labor (NIDL) in the globalized economy affects gender inequalities has not been sufficiently explored yet. The body of literature on commodity chains that has attempted to assess the welfare effects of the NIDL, especially in less developed countries, has paid sparse attention to gender issues. Globalization has entailed the deverticalization of commodity supply chains and the emergence of highly concentrated financial groups and transnational companies linked to a network of firms operating as affiliates and suppliers, namely the global commodity chains. The NIDL could worsen gender inequality, due to the particular organizational strategies in global commodity chains that privilege power, instead of trust and market exchange, as the major form of governance and means for resource allocation. Because women represent the poorest swathe of the world’s population, they suffer the most from the growing wealth inequality and the concentration of power produced by the NIDL. Moreover, because of the traditional sexual division of labor and because of their low status in society, women are the most harshly exploited subjects in the system. The general conclusion of the paper is that in the NIDL the main means of resource allocation are not competitive markets, as often suggested by the GCV literature and mainstream economics, but are instead power relations that ultimately stem from the patriarchal culture of violence and domination.

Suggested Citation

  • Valeria Sodano, 2011. "The New Division of Labor in the Globalized Economy: Women’s Challenges and Opportunities," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(3), pages 281-298, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:fosoec:v:40:y:2011:i:3:p:281-298
    DOI: 10.1007/s12143-011-9096-7
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