Strategic Pricing of Commodities
We consider a setting where a large number of agents are trading commodity bundles. Assuming that agents of the same type have a certain utility attached to each transaction, we construct a statistical equilibrium which in turn implies prices on the different commodities. Our basic question is then the following. Assuming that some commodities come out with prices that are socially unacceptable, is it possible to change these prices systematically if a new type of agent is paid to enter the market? We will consider explicit examples where this can be done.
Volume (Year): 16 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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- Foley Duncan K., 1994. "A Statistical Equilibrium Theory of Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 321-345, April.
- Jörnsten, Kurt & Ubøe, Jan, 2010. "Quantification of preferences in markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 453-466, July.
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