Strategic pricing of commodities
In this paper we will consider a setting where a large number of agents are trading commodity bundles. Assuming that agents of the same type have a certain utility attached to each transaction, we construct a statistical equilibrium which in turn implies prices on the different commodities. Our basic question is then the following: Assume that some commodities come out with prices that are socially unacceptable. Is it possible to change these prices systematically if a new type of agents is paid to enter the market? In the paper we will consider explicit examples where this can be done.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2006|
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- Foley Duncan K., 1994. "A Statistical Equilibrium Theory of Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 321-345, April.
- Jörnsten, Kurt & Ubøe, Jan, 2010. "Quantification of preferences in markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 453-466, July.
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