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Judicial independence and economic freedom in the US states

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Abstract

This article addresses the extent to which differences in judicial independence across US states influence economic freedom by using the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of North America Index. Overall, the results suggest that, as judicial independence increases within a state's court of last resort, so does a state's overall economic freedom score, along with each of the subcomponent index scores. These findings add important nuances to the literature and provide opportunities for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Dove, 2016. "Judicial independence and economic freedom in the US states," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 78-83, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:23:y:2016:i:1:p:78-83
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1051649
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    1. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, 2006. "The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 399-440, June.
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    5. Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, 2014. "Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 79-104, June.
    6. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    7. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 431-473, June.
    8. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    9. Dove, John A., 2015. "The effect of judicial independence on entrepreneurship in the US states," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 72-96.
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