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Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution

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  • H. Shelton Brown
  • Luke Connelly

Abstract

Recently, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In places requiring community rating in their health insurance premiums, a major cause is age-based adverse selection. However, even in countries without community rating, a de facto type of partial community rating tends to occur. In this note, a modified version of Pauly et al.'s guaranteed renewability model, which addresses the problem of age-based adverse selection (Pauly et al., 1995) is presented. Their model is extended from three to 35 periods. Also, probabilities are allowed to increase by age for low-risk types using actual age-based probabilities. This extension of their work shows that private health insurance contracts available stray far from optimal contracts that deal with age-based adverse selection. This suggests that government actions to affect private insurance options are warranted.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Shelton Brown & Luke Connelly, 2005. "Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 281-284.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:12:y:2005:i:5:p:281-284
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850500041944
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pauly, Mark V & Kunreuther, Howard & Hirth, Richard, 1995. "Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 143-156, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ines Läufer, 2014. "Another perspective on the high uninsured-rate in the USA: Crowding out of long term health insurance by the institutional setting of the U.S. health insurance system," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 02/2014, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.

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