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Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values

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  • Aditya Vikram

    (Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur)

Abstract

We study a model in which a single object is to be allocated among a set of agents whose valuations are interdependent. We define signal-ranking mechanisms and show that if the signal-ranking allocation rule satisfies a combinatorial condition and the valuation functions are additively separable, there exist budget-balanced and ex-post incentive compatible signal-ranking mechanisms. For a restricted setting, we show that the worst-case efficient mechanism of Long et al. (Games Econ Behav 105:9–39, 2017) continues to be worst-case efficient. We also give an example to show that their mechanism is no longer optimal when restrictions are relaxed.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Vikram, 2024. "Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(1), pages 89-108, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01479-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x
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