On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Fabrice Barthélémy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2012. "On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games," Post-Print hal-01243433, HAL.
- Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2011. "On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games," THEMA Working Papers 2011-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
References listed on IDEAS
- William V. Gehrlein, 2002. "Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 503-512.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008.
"On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006. "On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2007. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Post-Print hal-01245310, HAL.
- Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dominique Lepelley & Vincent R Merlin & Jean-louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu, 2014.
"Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case,"
AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2201-2207.
- Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu, 2014. "Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case," Post-Print halshs-01102577, HAL.
More about this item
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:263-279. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.