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A value for games on colored communication structures

Author

Listed:
  • M. Ordóñez

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • A. Jiménez-Losada

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • Julio Fernández

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • Inés Gallego

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

Abstract

Colored graphs have been used in many areas of technological research such as computer science, multiprocessor systems, network topology, etc. Normally, the term colored graph is used in a graph where its nodes have been colored. However, we work with edge colored graphs, where the ones that have been colored are the edges. The main aim of this paper is to determine a way based on cooperative game theory to measure the importance of the nodes in a network using edge colored graphs.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Ordóñez & A. Jiménez-Losada & Julio Fernández & Inés Gallego, 2021. "A value for games on colored communication structures," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 2247-2260, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:operea:v:21:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s12351-019-00535-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s12351-019-00535-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
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