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Unveiling the familiar in the unconventional: the case of Klima DAO

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolai J. Foss

    (Copenhagen Business School)

  • Tianjiao Xu

    (Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

While we applaud Jirásek’s documentation of Klima DAO, we question a number of the arguments and conclusions in his article. In particular, we raise doubts concerning the extent to which Klima DAO truly represents a novel, particularly flat kind of organization. We also comment on other, unclear aspects of Klima DAO’s organization and the generalizability of this organizing mode to other contexts. In all, we are skeptical concerning the strong claims Jirásek makes about Klima DAO, including that it is “a model for future organizations in search of greater transparency and flatter governance structures.”

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolai J. Foss & Tianjiao Xu, 2023. "Unveiling the familiar in the unconventional: the case of Klima DAO," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 12(4), pages 289-291, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jorgde:v:12:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s41469-023-00157-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s41469-023-00157-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Frank Martela, 2019. "What makes self-managing organizations novel? Comparing how Weberian bureaucracy, Mintzberg’s adhocracy, and self-organizing solve six fundamental problems of organizing," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, December.
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