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Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games

Author

Listed:
  • S. Jørgensen

    (University of Southern Denmark)

  • G. Martín-Herrán

    (Universidad de Valladolid)

  • G. Zaccour

    (HEC-Montréal)

Abstract

The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal individual rationality concepts, can be verified in linear-state differential games. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Jørgensen & G. Martín-Herrán & G. Zaccour, 2003. "Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 119(1), pages 49-63, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:119:y:2003:i:1:d:10.1023_b:jota.0000005040.78280.a6
    DOI: 10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005040.78280.a6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leon A Petrosyan & Nikolay A Zenkevich, 2016. "Game Theory," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 9824, January.
    2. Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
    3. Jorgensen, Steffen & Zaccour, Georges, 2001. "Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1973-1987, December.
    4. Kaitala, Veijo & Pohjola, Matti, 1990. "Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 421-438, May.
    5. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Cabo & Mabel Tidball, 2022. "Cooperation in a Dynamic Setting with Asymmetric Environmental Valuation and Responsibility," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 844-871, September.
    2. Hao Xu & Ming Luo, 2022. "Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-25, July.
    3. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2018. "Consumer surplus-enhancing cooperation in a natural resource oligopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 185-193.
    4. Petrosian Ovanes, 2016. "Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-14, June.
    5. Ekaterina Gromova & Anastasiya Malakhova & Arsen Palestini, 2018. "Payoff Distribution in a Multi-Company Extraction Game with Uncertain Duration," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 6(9), pages 1-17, September.
    6. Germain, Marc & Tulkens, Henry & Magnus, Alphonse, 2010. "Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 208-226, March.
    7. Marc GERMAIN & Henry TULKENS & Alphonse MAGNUS, 2009. "Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2009015, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    8. Ovanes Petrosian, 2018. "About the Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games with Transferable Utility," HSE Working papers WP BRP 183/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Ricardo Josa-Fombellida & Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero, 2018. "Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 379-400, June.
    10. Ovanes Petrosian & Andrey Barabanov, 2017. "Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games with Uncertain Stochastic Dynamics," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 328-347, January.
    11. Ovanes Petrosian & Lihong Shi & Yin Li & Hongwei Gao, 2019. "Moving Information Horizon Approach for Dynamic Game Models," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(12), pages 1-31, December.
    12. Simon Hoof, 2018. "Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games," Working Papers CIE 112, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    13. Javier Frutos & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2015. "Does Flexibility Facilitate Sustainability of Cooperation Over Time? A Case Study from Environmental Economics," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 165(2), pages 657-677, May.

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