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Markov Perfect Equilibrium Existence for a Class of Undiscounted Infinite-Horizon Dynamic Games

Author

Listed:
  • A. Garcia

    (The Brattle Group)

  • R. L. Smith

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

We prove the existence of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) for nonstationary undiscounted infinite-horizon dynamic games with alternating moves. A suitable finite-horizon equilibrium relaxation, the ending state constrained MPE, captures the relevant features of an infinite-horizon MPE for a long enough horizon, under a uniformly bounded reachability assumption.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Garcia & R. L. Smith, 2000. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium Existence for a Class of Undiscounted Infinite-Horizon Dynamic Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 106(2), pages 421-429, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:106:y:2000:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1004663800322
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004663800322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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