Of rotten kids and Rawlsian parents: The optimal timing of intergenerational transfers
This paper shows that altruistic parents with utilitarian preferences may fare better if they transfer resources to their children early in life instead of delaying the bulk of transfers until after their death. Moreover, the outcome of the analysed "family transfer game" is not Pareto-efficient in the case of bequests. However, if altruistic parents hold Rawlsian preferences, they will be indifferent between gifts and bequests, and Pareto-efficiency is always obtained. In intermediate cases of Atkinson-type welfare functions, welfare losses of bequests compared to gifts disappear as the aversion to inequality converges to infinity.
Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 3 November 1998/Accepted: 4 May 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/population/journal/148/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:13:y:2000:i:1:p:147-157. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.