A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
This note demonstrates that a lattice game with strategic substitutes is dominancesolvable if and only if there exists a unique fixed point of the function that results from an iteration of the best response function. This finding complements a result of Milgrom and Robertsâ€™ (1990) by which a lattice game with strategic complements is dominance-solvable if and only if there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our main result by an application to a model of Cournot outcomecompetition.
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Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 4742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vives, Xavier, 1990.
"Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities,"
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Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
- D. B. Bernheim, 2010.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
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