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A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem

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  • Guilherme Carmona

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  • Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 131-151, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:131-151
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0010-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guilherme Carmona, 2002. "On the notion of social institutions," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp421, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    2. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April.
    5. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    6. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
    7. Jørgen Jacobsen, Hans, 1996. "On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 67-88, April.
    8. Lipman, Barton L. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1990. "Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 273-290, September.
    9. Piccione, Michele, 1992. "Finite automata equilibria with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 180-193, February.
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