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Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games

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  • Lipman, Barton L.
  • Srivastava, Sanjay

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  • Lipman, Barton L. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1990. "Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 273-290, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:3:p:273-290
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Jones, Matthew T., 2014. "Strategic complexity and cooperation: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 352-366.
    3. Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp425, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    4. V. Bhaskar & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications," Game Theory and Information 9809003, EconWPA.
    5. Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2002. "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 334-350, April.
    6. V. Bhaskar, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 135-149.
    7. Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 131-151, April.
    8. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0311005, EconWPA.

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