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Exploring the role of character traits in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma using case-based decision theory

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  • James Boohaker

    (U.S. Federal Government)

Abstract

The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has become a popular tool to model human interaction in collective action problems. Since the prisoner’s dilemma tournaments conducted by Robert Axelrod in the 1980 s, several researchers have tried to model decision making and best strategies in this game. The literature largely finds that patience, repeated interaction and familiarity with other participants lead to higher rates of sustained cooperation. However, few papers have explored the role of common human character traits such as ambition, envy (wanting to emulate others) and jealousy (wanting others to lose what they have) on long-term decision making in these environments. In this paper, I use agent-based simulation techniques grounded in case-based decision theory (CBDT) introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) that allow agents to make decisions based on past experiences to show that jealousy and ambition curtail sustained cooperation in the IPD, while envy promotes cooperation. I show that decision making for these different types of agents is sensitive to how they form their levels of aspiration (i.e., the amount they want to receive after an interaction). I then go on to show that ambitious and jealous agent behavior can affect non-ambitious and non-jealous behavior in mixed environments. Finally, I show that trends in cooperation in an environment where all these traits are randomly distributed align well with what is found in the literature. I hope conclusions in this paper create testable hypotheses for subsequent experimental research analyzing the role of human behavior and cooperation in the IPD.

Suggested Citation

  • James Boohaker, 2025. "Exploring the role of character traits in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma using case-based decision theory," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 20(2), pages 335-370, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:20:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s11403-024-00436-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11403-024-00436-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Todd Guilfoos & Andreas Pape, 2016. "Predicting human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma using case-based decision theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 1-32, January.
    2. Lin, Ying-Ting & Yang, Han-Xin & Wu, Zhi-Xi & Wang, Bing-Hong, 2011. "Promotion of cooperation by aspiration-induced migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(1), pages 77-82.
    3. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1995. "Case-Based Decision Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 605-639.
    4. Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari, 2009. "Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 979-1005, June.
    5. Casal, Sandro & Güth, Werner & Jia, Mofei & Ploner, Matteo, 2012. "Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 857-865.
    6. Chen, Ya-Shan & Yang, Han-Xin & Guo, Wen-Zhong, 2017. "Aspiration-induced dormancy promotes cooperation in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 469(C), pages 625-630.
    7. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-429, February.
    8. Kirchsteiger, Georg, 1994. "The role of envy in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 373-389, December.
    9. Luis R. Izquierdo & Nicholas M. Gotts & J. Gareth Polhill, 2004. "Case-Based Reasoning, Social Dilemmas, and a New Equilibrium Concept," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 7(3), pages 1-1.
    10. Inga Wobker, 2015. "The Price of Envy—An Experimental Investigation of Spiteful Behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(5), pages 326-335, July.
    11. Zhang, Jun & Fang, Yi-Ping & Du, Wen-Bo & Cao, Xian-Bin, 2011. "Promotion of cooperation in aspiration-based spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(12), pages 2258-2266.
    12. Pedro Dal Bó & Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2018. "On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 60-114, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C63; C71; C73; D01; D70; D80; D91;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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