Towards a synthesis of theories of State failure
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 2004. "Misconceptions Regarding Rules vs. Discretion for Monetary Policy," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, pages 365-372.
- Robinson, Joan, 1978. "Contributions to Modern Economics," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780125905503.
- Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 19-46.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Facchini, François & Melki, Mickaël, 2013.
"Efficient government size: France in the 20th century,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-14.
- François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal Government Size and Economic Growth in France (1871-2008): An explanation by the State and Market Failures," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal government size and economic growth in France (1871-2008) : An explanation by the State and market failures," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00654363, HAL.
More about this item
Keywordsstate failure; property rights; market mechanism; public choice; rational expectations;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:54:y:2007:i:1:p:13-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .