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How efficient can international compensation regimes be in pollution prevention? A discussion of the case of marine oil spills

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  • Julien Hay

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  • Julien Hay, 2010. "How efficient can international compensation regimes be in pollution prevention? A discussion of the case of marine oil spills," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 29-44, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:10:y:2010:i:1:p:29-44
    DOI: 10.1007/s10784-009-9096-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    2. Brooks, Richard R W, 2002. "Liability and Organizational Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 91-125, April.
    3. Mason, Michael, 2003. "Civil liability for oil pollution damage: examining the evolving scope for environmental compensation in the international regime," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-12, January.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. Santiago J. Rubio & Alistair Ulph, 2006. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 233-263, April.
    6. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    7. Faure, Michael & Wang, Hui, 2008. "Financial caps for oil pollution damage: A historical mistake?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 592-606, July.
    8. Pitchford, Rohan, 1995. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1171-1186, December.
    9. Burrows, Paul & Rowley, Charles & Owen, David, 1974. "The economics of accidental oil pollution by tankers in coastal waters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 251-268, August.
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