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Power in Networks: The Medici

Author

Listed:
  • Manfred J. Holler

    (University of Hamburg, and CCR-Munich)

  • Florian Rupp

    (Kutaisi International University, Technical University Munich, and CCR-Munich)

Abstract

We use the Public Good (Power) Index and the Public Value to rank the marriages of business relations of 15 elite families in fifteenth century Florence—with a focus on the networks of the Medici and the taking of power by Cosimo de’ Medici. Theoretical analysis supports the outstanding position of the Medici family and explains much of its historical success.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred J. Holler & Florian Rupp, 2021. "Power in Networks: The Medici," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 59-75, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:38:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-021-00108-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-021-00108-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
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    4. José Alonso-Meijide & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Manfred Holler & Andreas Nohn, 2010. "Axiomatizations of public good indices with a priori unions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 517-533, September.
    5. Nurmi, Hannu, 2005. "Aggregation problems in policy evaluation: an overview," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 287-300, June.
    6. Manfred J.Holler & Mika Widgren, 1999. "The Value of Coalition Power," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 15, pages 497-511.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Yuto Ushioda & Masato Tanaka & Tomomi Matsui, 2022. "Monte Carlo Methods for the Shapley–Shubik Power Index," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-14, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Medici; Cosimo de’ Medici; Machiavelli; Marriage network; Business network; Marriage-business network; Power index analysis; Public Good Index; Public Value; Network rigidity; Social embeddedness; Robust action;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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