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The Minimal Quota for a Complete Majority Relation to be Transitive

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  • Laurent Vidu

    (Université de Caen
    Universität Bielefeld)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that 2/3 is the minimal quota that guarantees the transitivity of a complete majority relation independently of the number of candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Vidu, 2000. "The Minimal Quota for a Complete Majority Relation to be Transitive," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(6), pages 531-534, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:9:y:2000:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1008782230869
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008782230869
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Donald G. Saari, 1997. "The generic existence of a core for q -rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 219-260.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
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