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An Abortion Based Search Method for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation

Author

Listed:
  • Changder Narayan

    (National Institute of Technology Durgapur)

  • Aknine Samir

    (Lyon 1 University)

  • Dutta Animesh

    (National Institute of Technology Durgapur)

Abstract

The Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) problem is a partitioning of a set of agents into exhaustive and disjoint subsets to maximize social welfare. This NP-complete problem arises in many practical scenarios. Prominent examples are included in the field of transportation, e-Commerce, distributed sensor networks, and others. The fastest exact algorithm to solve the CSG problem is ODP-IP, which is a hybrid version of two previously established algorithms, namely Improved Dynamic Programming (IDP) and IP. In this paper, we show that the ODP-IP algorithm performs many redundant operations. To improve ODP-IP, we propose a faster abortion mechanism to speed up IP’s search. Our abortion mechanism decides at runtime which of the IP’s operations are redundant to skip them. Then, we propose a modified version of IDP (named MIDP) and an improved version of IP (named IIP). Based on these two improved algorithms, we develop a hybrid version (MIDP-IIP) to solve the CSG problem. After a detailed description of the new algorithm MIDP-IIP, an experimental comparison is conducted against ODP-IP. Our analysis shows that MIDP-IIP performs fewer operations than ODP-IP. In addition, MIDP-IIP reduced significantly many problem instances running times (11–37%).

Suggested Citation

  • Changder Narayan & Aknine Samir & Dutta Animesh, 2022. "An Abortion Based Search Method for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 747-768, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:31:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-022-09781-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-022-09781-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael H. Rothkopf & Aleksandar Pekev{c} & Ronald M. Harstad, 1998. "Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1131-1147, August.
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