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The Price of History-Independent Strategies in Games with Inter-Temporal Externalities

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  • Yevgeny Tsodikovich

    (Bar Ilan University)

  • Xavier Venel

    (LUISS)

  • Anna Zseleva

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

In this paper, we compare the value of zero-sum stochastic games under optimal strategies (that are, for single-controller stochastic games, stationary) to the commonly used time-independent strategies (“static strategies”). Our findings are summarized in a series of theorems which provide the lower bound on the optimality of the static strategy under different assumptions. These bounds can be used to assess whether the additional computational complexity is worth the extra payoff gain or, symmetrically, assess the price of playing sub-optimal but simple strategies when stationary ones are forbidden.

Suggested Citation

  • Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Xavier Venel & Anna Zseleva, 2024. "The Price of History-Independent Strategies in Games with Inter-Temporal Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 1317-1332, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:14:y:2024:i:5:d:10.1007_s13235-024-00555-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-024-00555-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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