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Social norms as choreography

Author

Listed:
  • Herbert Gintis

    (Santa Fe Institute, USA and Central European University, Hungary, hgintis@comcast.net)

Abstract

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need in addition only to posit that individuals obey the social norm when it is costless to do so. When the correlating device has incomplete information, the operation of the social norm requires that individuals have a predisposition to follow the norm even when this is costly. The latter case explains why social norms are associated with other-regarding preferences and provides a basis for analyzing honesty and corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Gintis, 2010. "Social norms as choreography," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 9(3), pages 251-264, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:9:y:2010:i:3:p:251-264
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X09345474
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Karine Nyborg, 2020. "No Man is an Island: Social Coordination and the Environment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(1), pages 177-193, May.
    2. Amrei Lahno & Bernd Lahno, 2018. "Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 393-422.
    3. d'Adda, Giovanna & Dufwenberg, Martin & Passarelli, Francesco & Tabellini, Guido, 2020. "Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 288-304.
    4. Amato, Clara & Gino, Francesca & Montinari, Natalia & Sacco, Pierluigi, 2020. "Cheating, inequality aversion, and appealing to social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 767-776.
    5. Babin, J. Jobu & Foray, Marine & Hussey, Andrew, 2021. "Shelter-in-place orders, loneliness, and collaborative behavior," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    6. Johnson, Noel, 2015. "Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building: Evidence from France," MPRA Paper 63598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Tom R. Burns & Ewa Roszkowska & Nora Machado Des Johansson & Ugo Corte, 2018. "Paradigm Shift in Game Theory: Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-40, March.
    8. Mielke, Jahel & Steudle, Gesine A., 2018. "Green Investment and Coordination Failure: An Investors' Perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 88-95.
    9. Heap, Shaun P. Hargreaves & Matakos, Konstantinos & Weber, Nina Sophie, 2020. "Non-selfish behaviour: Are social preferences or social norms revealed in distribution decisions?," SocArXiv g4c2m, Center for Open Science.

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