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Simultaneous elections

Author

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  • Enriqueta Aragones

Abstract

This article analyzes the possible electoral advantages and disadvantages of a unique party that competes in two simultaneous elections with respect to those obtained when it competes as two different parties. I assume that a unified party has a larger strategy set but it is forced to choose the same policy in both elections. I analyze different scenarios depending on the features of the electorates and of the party configuration that it faces: the same party or two different parties. In all cases, I show that a unified party can only fare better than two independent parties when the two electorates are similar enough. In this case, the party may obtain the vote of the moderates in both elections. If the electorates are aligned with the opponent the gains from unification are more likely in more polarized electorates. Otherwise, the losses from unification increase with the intensity of the electoral competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Enriqueta Aragones, 2025. "Simultaneous elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 37(1), pages 3-51, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:37:y:2025:i:1:p:3-51
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298241295734
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hummel, Patrick, 2010. "Flip-flopping from primaries to general elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1020-1027, December.
    2. Brancati, Dawn, 2008. "The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 135-159, January.
    3. Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, 2010. "Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 371-388, April.
    4. Steven Callander, 2005. "Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 1116-1145, October.
    5. Marina Agranov, 2016. "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 61-85, May.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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