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Heresthetics and choice from tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Scott Moser

    (School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK
    Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA)

  • Molly Fenn

    (Department of Mathematics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA)

  • Ran Ji

    (Department of Mathematics, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA)

  • Michelle Maiden

    (Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Meredith College, Raleigh, NC, USA)

  • Melanie Panosian

    (Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA, USA)

Abstract

Moser et al. provide a formalization of heresthetics, the “art of political strategy†, in collective choice settings. In doing so they introduce the heresthetically stable set as the set of outcomes least susceptible to manipulation of issue dimension. In this note we correct a small error in the original paper, and close several open questions asked there in. We examine the heresthetically stable set as a tournament solution, establishing some basic properties it possesses, and many it does not posses. In addition, we relate the heresthetically stable set to other tournament solutions, notably the weak uncovered and refinements thereof. We find lack of vulnerability to heresthetic manipulation is contrary to many desirable properties of choice functions, notably majoritarian support.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Moser & Molly Fenn & Ran Ji & Michelle Maiden & Melanie Panosian, 2016. "Heresthetics and choice from tournaments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 385-407, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:28:y:2016:i:3:p:385-407
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629814568398
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
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