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Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating

Author

Listed:
  • Muhammet A Bas

    (Department of Government, Harvard University, Harvard, MA, USA)

  • Curtis S Signorino

    (Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA)

  • Taehee Whang

    (Division of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Korea)

Abstract

We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model , relies on a parameter, Ï , which denotes the correlation between two agents’ private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where Ï =0 and Ï =1, respectively. The model also allows 0

Suggested Citation

  • Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:1:p:3-34
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813482054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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