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A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence

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  • Curtis S. Signorino
  • Ahmer Tarar

Abstract

We present a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence—unified in the sense that we employ our theoretical deterrence model as our statistical model in the empirical analysis. The theoretical model is a straightforward formalization of the deterrence logic in Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1984), coupled with private information concerning utilities. Our statistical analysis suggests that the attacker and defender's decisions are influenced by the balance of forces, nuclear weapons, defender‐protege military alliances, arms transfers, and trade, as well as the regime types of those involved. Many of these findings contradict previous research by Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1988). We find that many of the variables involved in the deterrence calculus are nonmonotonically linked to the probability of deterrence success or war. We illustrate the results with case studies of the Soviet‐Japanese dispute over Manchukuo (1937–1938) and the Berlin Blockade (1948).

Suggested Citation

  • Curtis S. Signorino & Ahmer Tarar, 2006. "A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 586-605, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:3:p:586-605
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00203.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Jesse C. Johnson & Brett Ashley Leeds & Ahra Wu, 2015. "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 309-336, March.
    2. Aysegul Aydin, 2010. "The deterrent effects of economic integration," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(5), pages 523-533, September.
    3. Shiko Maruyama, 2009. "Estimating Sequential-move Games by a Recursive Conditioning Simulator," Discussion Papers 2009-01, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    4. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    5. Thiemo Fetzer & Carlo Schwarz, 2021. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1717-1741.
    6. HÃ¥vard Hegre, 2008. "Gravitating toward War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 566-589, August.
    7. Michael Horowitz, 2009. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 234-257, April.
    8. Muhammet A. Bas, 2012. "Measuring Uncertainty in International Relations: Heteroskedastic Strategic Models," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(5), pages 490-520, November.
    9. Aradillas-Lopez, Andres, 2012. "Pairwise-difference estimation of incomplete information games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 120-140.
    10. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Winning with the Bomb," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 278-301, April.
    11. Maruyama, Shiko, 2014. "Estimation of finite sequential games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 178(2), pages 716-726.
    12. Kevin A. Clarke & Curtis S. Signorino, 2010. "Discriminating Methods: Tests for Non‐nested Discrete Choice Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(2), pages 368-388, March.
    13. Kenkel, Brenton & Signorino, Curtis, 2014. "Estimating Extensive Form Games in R," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 56(i08).
    14. Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, 2017. "The role of international organizations in regime transitions: How IGOs can tie a dictator’s hands," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 406-430, July.

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