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Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

    (University of California, Los Angeles, acayeros@polisci.ucla.edu)

  • Beatriz Magaloni

    (Stanford University, University of California, Los Angeles, magaloni@leland.stanford.edu)

Abstract

This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Our argument is that electoral rules facilitated party dominance through two mechanisms: electoral rules disproportionately rewarded existing majorities and, at the same time, discouraged potential majorities from forming. More specifically, the rules rewarded parties that could win a majority of the vote in single-member districts; but at the same time, rewarded minority parties with seats from multi-member districts, mitigating Duvergerian incentives to coordinate behind a single challenger. In the short run, seats from multi-member districts benefited opposition parties by significantly reducing entry costs; in the long run, however, these seats helped sustain party dominance, by discouraging coordination among opposition parties and voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Diaz-Cayeros & Beatriz Magaloni, 2001. "Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(3), pages 271-293, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:271-293
    DOI: 10.1177/095169280101300303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Boix, Carles, 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 609-624, September.
    4. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900.
    5. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Political Loyalty Vs Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Politics in Russia’S Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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