IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jospec/v3y2002i2p122-132.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Property Rights and Unilateral Player Transfers in a Multiconference Sports League

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel R. Marburger

    (Arkansas State University)

Abstract

According to the invariance hypothesis, the allocation of players in sports leagues is the same, regardless of who owns their property rights. However, when a player moves to a new team, the absolute quality of the new team increases while the absolute quality of the former team decreases. This implies that intraconference teams will be willing to bid more for players than interconference teams. However, the asking price for player sales to intraconference teams will be higher than for interconference clubs. If clubs own player property rights, the intraconference effects are built into the ask/bid price. When players own property rights, however, the effect of the transfer on the former club’s revenue stream is ignored. This suggests that free agency should result in a higher percentage of intraconference player transfers than player sales. Player sale data from 1964-1975 and free agency data between 1976-1992 reveal evidence consistent with theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel R. Marburger, 2002. "Property Rights and Unilateral Player Transfers in a Multiconference Sports League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(2), pages 122-132, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:122-132
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://jse.sagepub.com/content/3/2/122.abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pamela Wicker & Christian Weingärtner & Christoph Breuer & Helmut Dietl, 2012. "The Effect of a Sports Institution’s Legal Structure on Sponsorship Income: The Case of Amateur Equestrian Sports in Germany," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 7(4), pages 340-357, November.
    2. Fort, Rodney & Maxcy, Joel & Diehl, Mark, 2016. "Uncertainty by regulation: Rottenberg׳s invariance principle," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 454-467.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:122-132. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.