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Are Voluntary Agreements Better? Evidence from Baseball Arbitration

Author

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  • John W. Budd
  • Aaron Sojourner
  • Jaewoo Jung

Abstract

This study empirically examines the widespread belief that voluntarily negotiated agreements produce better long-run relationships than do third-party imposed resolutions, such as arbitrator decisions or court judgments. Major League Baseball provides a compelling setting for these analyses because individual performance is well measured, there is the possibility of relationship breakdown, and both voluntary and arbitrator-imposed resolutions routinely occur. Two key outcomes are analyzed: post-resolution player performance and the durability of the club–player relationship. Multivariate analyses of 1,424 salary renegotiations fail to find significant differences in subsequent player performance, but voluntary resolutions are associated with more durable post-resolution club–player relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • John W. Budd & Aaron Sojourner & Jaewoo Jung, 2017. "Are Voluntary Agreements Better? Evidence from Baseball Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 70(4), pages 865-893, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:70:y:2017:i:4:p:865-893
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    Cited by:

    1. Bradley R. Weinberg, 2020. "Third-Party Intervention and the Preservation of Bargaining Relationships," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(2), pages 498-527, March.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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