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The Eco-Industrial Complex in USA — Global Warming and Rent-Seeking Coalitions

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  • Ivan Jankovic

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, postgraduate student)

Abstract

The public choice model of rent-seeking economics is used to analyze the behaviour of firms, interest groups and scientists participating in efforts to impose climate change cap-and-trade regulations of greenhouse gasses in the USA. This may serve as a case study for the entire world. Yandle's “Bootleggers and Baptists†model and McChesney's model “money for nothing†are used to explain the formation, motives and interests of the groups lobbying for or against this type of regulation. The eco-industrial complex includes firms seeking favorable treatment under cap-and-trade regime, scientists relying on the global warming panic to keep research funds flowing and environmentalist NGOs interested in setting the public agenda and attracting grants and donations. According to our analysis nuclear and renewable energy firms are acting as bootleggers (who profit from legally restricted energy market), while the oil firms are behaving as agents paying protection money) to politicians and NGOs for not demanding harmful public regulation (legal extortion, i.e. “money for nothing†).

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Jankovic, 2008. "The Eco-Industrial Complex in USA — Global Warming and Rent-Seeking Coalitions," Energy & Environment, , vol. 19(7), pages 941-958, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:engenv:v:19:y:2008:i:7:p:941-958
    DOI: 10.1260/095830508786238279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen & Aynsley Kellow, 2002. "International Environmental Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2532, March.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
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